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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that, in studying the monetary policy transmission process, more
emphasis should be given to the systematic portion of policy behavior and correspondingly less to
random shocks—basically because shocks account for a very small fraction of policy-instrument
variability.  Analysis of the effects of the systematic part of policy requires structural modelling,
rather than VAR procedures, because the latter do not give rise to behavioral relationships that
can plausibly be regarded as policy-invariant.  By use of an illustrative open-economy structural
model based on optimizing analysis, and considering variants, the paper characterizes the effects
of policy parameter settings by means of impulse response functions and root-mean-square
statistics for target errors.  Different models give different answers to questions about the effects
of systematic policy, so procedures for scrutinizing model specification are essential. In this
regard, it is argued that vector autocorrelation functions, augmented by variance statistics for
each of a model’s variables, seem more promising than impulse response functions because the
latter require shock identification, which is inherently a difficult process.
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The purpose of this paper is to consider several methodological issues relevant
for study of the monetary transmission process.  These issues involve relative emphasis
on monetary shocks as opposed to systematic policy adjustments; vector autoregression
vs. structural modelling research strategies; impulse response vs. vector autocorrelation
functions as diagnostic tools; and an evaluation of the so-called narrative approach.
But while these methodological issues are stressed, the paper’s approach is
significantly substantive, in the sense that the issues will be considered in the context
of a non-trivial quantitative analysis that is intended to be of interest on its own.
As a preliminary matter, it may be useful to outline what meaning is here being
given to the term “monetary transmission mechanism.”  That this term evokes different
responses from different scholars is well illustrated by a recent symposium on “The
Monetary Transmission Mechanism” featured in the Fall 1995 issue of the Journal of
Economic Perspectives.  In the papers of that symposium, Bernanke and Gertler (1995)
focus on the credit channel; Meltzer (1995) promotes monetarist emphasis on the
importance of recognizing multiple assets;
1  Taylor (1995) outlines a particular
econometric framework for studying the transmission mechanism; Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995) discuss foreign exchange-rate policy and financial crises; and Mishkin (1995)
provides a brief overview.  More generally, many writers on the subject restrict their
attention to the effects of monetary policy shocks,
2 while some are concerned only with
                                               
1   Meltzer’s contribution to another 1995 symposium entitled “Channels of Monetary Policy,”
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, focusses instead on the role of nominal price
stickiness.
2   Some examples are Cochrane (1994), Sims (1992), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998), Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996), and Bernanke and Blinder (1992).2
effects on real variables. In the present paper, however, the concept of the transmission
process to be considered includes effects on both real and nominal variables of shocks
and more especially the regular, systematic component of monetary policy.  The
implied definition, therefore, is similar to that expressed by Taylor (1995, p. 11): “the
process through which monetary policy decisions are transmitted into changes in real
GDP and inflation.”
An outline of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, it is argued that study of the
systematic component of monetary policy actions is at least as important as the study
of the unsystematic component—a.k.a., policy shocks.  Then Section 3 presents some
procedures for exhibiting effects on inflation, output, and other variables of different
systematic policy responses.  These differences are, of course, model specific: they
depend upon the structural specification of the model being utilized.  In Section 4,
consequently, some variants of the basic model utilized in Section 3 are considered.  It
is demonstrated that systematic policy effects are significantly dependent upon
specifications relating to price adjustment behavior, habit formation in saving vs.
consumption decisions, and the economy’s openness to foreign trade.  This dependence
is expressed in terms of root-mean-square statistics for inflation targeting errors and
output gap measures, and also in terms of the characteristics of impulse response
functions for shocks other than the monetary policy shock.  Section 5 concerns
diagnostic tools to be used in the construction of structural models; here it is suggested
that more attention should be given to vector autocorrelation functions (and
correspondingly less to impulse response functions) than is typically the case in the
vector-autoregression (VAR) literature.  Finally, Section 6 offers a partial evaluation3
and criticism of the “narrative approach” introduced by Romer and Romer (1989) and a
non-standard VAR procedure recently utilized by Sims (1998), plus brief comments on
relevant papers by Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) and Dotsey (1999).  A brief
conclusion appears in Section 7.
2. Shocks vs. Systematic Policy
There exists a large volume of literature, much of it highly sophisticated, in
which the effects of monetary policy on output, prices, and other variables are
discussed entirely in terms of policy shocks.
3  In this context, policy shocks represent
the random, unsystematic component of the monetary authorities’ actions, i.e., the
portion that is not related to the state of the economy, current or past.  A leading theme
of the present paper is that emphasis on the shock component has been overdone; that
while both shocks and the systematic component of behavior are important, it would be
more fruitful to emphasize the latter.  This point of view has been taken by a number of
analysts, including Taylor (1995), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999), and
Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997), but needs to be stressed nevertheless because of
the sheer volume of literature that differs in this crucial respect.
Perhaps the simplest way of arguing for an emphasis on the systematic
component of policy is to recognize that quantitatively the unsystematic portion of
policy-instrument variability is quite small in relation to the variability of the
systematic component.  An illustration is provided by the prominent study by Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (1998) of policy behavior since 1979 by central banks of the G-3
nations.  In particular, their “baseline” estimations of monthly Bundesbank, Bank of4
Japan, and Federal Reserve reaction functions indicate that the fraction of monthly
interest-instrument variability that is unexplained by systematic determinants is only
1.9, 3.0, and 1.6 percent, respectively.
4  Also, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and
McCallum and Nelson (1998) find in the U.S. quarterly data that only about 5 percent
of instrument variability is unexplained over roughly the same period.
Indeed, it is conceivable that policy behavior could be virtually devoid of any
unsystematic component.  In the limit, that is, the variance of the shock component
could approach zero.  But this would not imply that monetary policy is unimportant for
price level behavior, a central bank’s main responsibility.  Nor would it imply that
policy is unimportant for real cyclical activity unless the economy is of the rather
special type that satisfies the “policy ineffectiveness” proposition.
5  More generally, it
should be kept in mind that when a central bank raises its interest-rate instrument by
(e.g.) 50 basis points “in order to head off inflation,” the action is likely to represent a
systematic response, not a shock.
To illustrate the implications of some less extreme and less obvious
phenomena, let us consider a simplified analytical representation of monetary policy
behavior and its consequences for output and inflation.  Here (and in the remainder of
the paper) let Rt, yt, and pt denote a short-term nominal interest rate, the logarithm of
real output, and the log of the price level.  Also let y t be the natural-rate value of yt,
                                                                                                                                       
3   An extensive and sophisticated surrey of this portion of the literature is provided by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997).  Also see Bernanke and Mihov (1997) and Sims (1992).
4   I thank Richard Clarida for providing me with the relevant standard deviations.
5   It is well-known that most models with non-instantaneous price adjustment behavior do not satisfy
this proposition.5
with  p t the associated price level,
6 and let vt and et represent shocks to spending and
monetary policy behavior.  Thus et is the unsystematic component of policy.  To keep
the present example simple, we temporarily pretend that y t is a constant and normalize
it as  y = 0, so that yt also measures output relative to its natural-rate value.  Our
schematic model is given by three equations, as follows:
(1) yt = b0 + b1 (Rt – EtDpt+1) + Etyt+1 + vt                                    b1 < 0,
(2) pt – pt-1 = (1-a)(p t-1 – pt-1) + Et-1 (p t - p t-1)                            0 < a < 1,
(3) Rt = Et-1Dpt+1 + m0 + m1(Et-1Dpt+1 - p
*) + et                                             m1 > 0.
The first of these is an IS-type relation representing demand for current output, i.e.,
saving vs. spending behavior.  Optimizing theory suggests that the variable Etyt+1
should appear as indicated on the right-hand side; this has been argued by Kerr and
King (1996), McCallum and Nelson (1999), and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997),
among others.  Neglect of this term would not simplify derivations substantially and
would not affect the main points of the analysis.
7  This future expected income term
will be incorporated, accordingly, in the quantitative models of Sections 3-4.
Equation (2) is one form of the P-bar price adjustment relation that was
rationalized and utilized in recent papers by McCallum and Nelson (1997, 1998).  It is
not as widely used as the Calvo-Rotemberg model
8 or variants of the Fuhrer-Moore
                                               
6   The natural-rate concept used in this paper is the value of yt that would prevail if prices were fully
flexible; i.e., if there were no nominal stickiness in the economy.
7   That some fundamental points can be unaffected by this type of neglect is demonstrated by two
examples in McCallum and Nelson (1999).  Such is definitely not true in general,  however.
8   References are Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg (1982).6
(1995) specification, but its theoretical properties are arguably superior.
9  In any event,
most of the points to be made here would carry over to other price-adjustment
specifications.  And in our quantitative work below, the Fuhrer-Moore specification
will be considered in addition to (2).  Note that the variable  pt in (2) is the value of pt
that would induce producers to make yt = yt.
Equation (3) represents monetary policy behavior according to which an
interest rate instrument Rt is set each period so as to raise the expected real rate of
interest, Rt – Et-1Dpt+1, when the expected future inflation rate exceeds the target value
p
*.  With m0 chosen to equal the average real rate of interest, (3) amounts to a special
case of a forward-looking Taylor rule.  Expectations are dated t-1 in (3) so as to
realistically limit the information available to the central bank when setting Rt.  The
notation is that Etzt+j ” E(zt+j‰Wt), where Wt includes variables dated t and earlier.
Solution of the foregoing model is facilitated by the fact, demonstrated in
McCallum and Nelson (1997), that (2) implies that Et-1y ~ t = ay ~
t-1, where  y ~
t ” yt - yt.
In the present setting with  yt = 0, yt = y ~
t so we have Et-1yt = ayt-1.  Then the minimal-
state-variable (MSV) rational expectations solution
10 for yt and Dpt is of the form
(4) yt = f10 + f11yt-1 + f12 vt + f13et
(5) Dpt = f20 + f21yt-1 + f22vt + f23et.
and it is clear that f10 = 0, f11 = a.  Also, since prices are fully predetermined, f22 = f23
= 0.  Given these facts, the undetermined coefficient procedure can be used to find the
remaining values of the fij.  The solution, it turns out, is
                                                
9   In particular, the P-bar model satisfies the natural-rate hypothesis, i.e., that E(yt -  y t) = 0 for any
monetary policy rule, which is not the case for the other two specifications.7
(6) yt = ayt-1 + [m1/(1+m1)(1-a)]vt + [b1m1/(1+m1)(1-a)]et
(7) Dpt = p
* - (m0/m1) – (b0/b1m1) + [(1-a)/b1m1]yt-1.
Now let us suppose that the above system were studied by some VAR approach
that correctly identified the policy shock term et.  The coefficient b1m1/(1+m1)(1-a) is
negative, so a VAR estimate of (6) would correctly find a negative effect on yt from a
positive shock to Rt, provided that there had been enough sample-period variation in et.
If et had stayed close to its mean value of zero, however, statistical procedures might
find no significant effect in finite samples of a realistic size.
In the case of Dpt, (7) indicates that the policy shock et plays no role when the
effect of yt-1 is taken into account, as it would be in any VAR study.  A study that
looked for monetary effects on inflation by the Granger-causality method would
therefore conclude that there are no such effects.  The method relying upon the
“fraction of explained variance” of the various shocks would attribute some portion to
et since et-1, et-2, … help to explain yt-1.  But the fraction of Dpt variability attributed to
monetary shocks would then be precisely the same as the fraction pertaining to yt
variability.  Note that since (1-a)/b1m1 < 0, these will be such that a surprise increase in
Rt will have the effect of increasing—rather than decreasing—subsequent values of
Dpt.  This is a rather perverse property of this simplified model.
11  But it is nevertheless
true that an increased value of the policy response parameter m1 will decrease the
variability of inflation, Dpt , in the system (1) – (3).
                                                                                                                                             
10   For an extensive discussion of the MSV solution concept, see McCallum (1999).
11   The perverse response of Dpt to a policy shock is not a general implication of the P-bar model, as will
be seen below.8
Furthermore, note that, since the unconditional mean Eyt equals zero by
construction, relation (1) implies that the average value of the real rate of interest rt =
Rt - EtDpt+1 equals -b0/b1.  Thus if the central bank chooses m0 to equal –b0/b1, as a
sensible policymaker would do, equation (7) reduces to
(7’) Dpt = p
* + [(1-a)/b1m1]yt-1.
Thus on average, over a large number of periods, realized inflation will tend to equal
p
*, a target rate that is entirely determined by monetary policy.
12  Within a given policy
regime, the “long-run”—i.e., unconditional mean—value of inflation is entirely




Having argued that it is more important to focus on the systematic portion of
monetary policy actions, rather than on shocks, we are then necessarily driven toward
the study of structural models, rather than VARs.
15  The reason is that even “identified”
or “semi-structural” VAR systems do not give rise to behavioral equations that can be
presumed to be structural, i.e., policy invariant.  The purpose of identified VARs is to
identify the unsystematic component of monetary policy, not to generate policy-
invariant equation systems.  But it is the latter that governs the effects of systematic or
anticipated policy actions.  This should be emphasized, for it is the crucial point of my
argument.  It is, I believe, consistent with the analysis and views of most creators and
                                               
12   If the central bank is mistaken in its belief about the average value of r, this will result in an average
inflation rate that differs from the target p
*.
13   Is there any evidence in approaches oriented toward structural relations such as (1)-(3)?  Given the
system (1)-(3), there is no hypothesis of this type testable with data from a single regime.  But there is
the possibility of testing specifications (1) and (2) against alternatives that imply the presence of money
illusion.9
practitioners of the identified VAR approach, including Bernanke, Blanchard and
Watson, and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans.
16  My position would not be accepted
by Sims (1998), however, so some discussion of his approach is included below (in
Section 6).  It should be noted that my objections to several aspects of VAR analysis
are not the same as those put forth by Rudebusch (1998).  In fact, they are not actually
objections to VAR analysis per se but rather are arguments for concentrating on the
systematic component of policy rather than the shocks.
3. Effects of Systematic Policy
In this section the purpose is to describe one approach to analysis of the effects
of the systematic component of monetary policy.  Since this undertaking requires use
of a structural model, according to the foregoing argument, the results obtained will
depend upon the adopted specification of economic behavior.  My starting point will be
the small scale, open economy, quarterly model based on optimizing analysis that is
developed and presented in McCallum and Nelson (1998).  The following paragraphs
will briefly outline that model and report some simulation results that serve to
characterize the effects of monetary policy.  Variants of the basic model will be
considered in Section 4.
Basing one’s analysis on the assumption of explicit optimizing behavior by the
modelled individuals in a general equilibrium setting is obviously not sufficient—and
                                                                                                                                       
14  Incidentally, as m1 ﬁ ¥ the solution becomes arbitrarily close to one in which Rt is set so as to make
Et-1Dpt+1 = p*.  This indicates that there is not much difference between “instrument rules” and the
“forecast targeting” procedure emphasized by Svensson (1998).
15   This statement presumes that expectations are rational.
16  Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997, p. 92) state that “It is not possible to infer the effects of
changes in policy rules from a standard identified VAR system….” Important references to the literature
include Bernanke (1986), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Blanchard and Watson (1986), Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998).10
perhaps not necessary—for the creation of a structural model that is specified with
reasonable accuracy relative to economic reality.  The optimizing general equilibrium
approach can be helpful in this respect, however, since it eliminates potential internal
logical inconsistencies that are possible when this source of intellectual discipline is
absent.  The model in McCallum and Nelson (1998), henceforth termed the M-N
model, has a very simple basic structure since it depicts an economy in which all
individuals are infinite-lived and alike.  As with many recent models designed for
policy analysis, it assumes that goods prices are “sticky,” i.e., adjust only slowly in
response to changes in conditions.  It differs from many previous efforts in this genre,
however, in three ways.  First, the gradual price-adjustment specification satisfies the
strict version of the natural-rate hypothesis.
17  Second, the modeled economy is open to
international trade of goods and securities.  And, third, individuals’ utility functions do
not feature time-separability, but instead depart in a manner that reflects “habit
formation.”
This last feature is specified as follows.  A typical agent desires at t to
maximize Et(Ut + bUt+1 + …), where the within-period measure Ut is specified as





Here Ct is a CES consumption index, Mt/Pt is real domestic money balances, vt is a
stochastic preference shock and h is a parameter satisfying 0 £ h < 1.  With h = 0,
preferences feature intertemporal separability, but with h > 0 there exists “habit
formation” that makes consumption demand less volatile.
                                               
17   This version is due to Lucas (1972).  For a brief discussion, see McCallum and Nelson (1997).11
The open-economy aspect of the model is one in which produced goods may be
consumed in the home economy  or sold abroad.  Imports are exclusively raw
materials, used as inputs in a production process that combines these materials and
labor according to a CES production function.  Capital accumulation is not modelled
endogenously, but securities are traded internationally.  The relative price of imports in
terms of domestic goods, i.e., the real exchange rate, affects the demand for exports
and imports, the latter in an explicit maximizing fashion.  Nominal exchange rates and
the home country one-period nominal interest rate are related by a version of
uncovered interest parity, one that realistically includes a stochastic “risk premium”
term (as in Taylor (1993b) and many multi-country econometric models).
Price adjustments conform to the P-bar model, mentioned above, but with
capacity output y t now treated as a variable that depends upon raw material inputs and
the state of technology, the latter driven by an exogenous stochastic shock that enters
production in a labor-augmenting fashion.
18  As mentioned above, price adjustment
behavior implies Et-1 y ~
t  = a  y ~
t-1, so application of the unconditional expectation
operator yields E  y ~
t = aEy ~
t and this implies Ey ~
t = 0 regardless of the monetary
policy rule employed.  This natural-rate property is not a feature of the Calvo-
Rotemberg or Fuhrer-Moore models of price adjustment.  Indeed, there are very few
sticky-price models that have the natural rate property, the only other one that I know
of being Gray-Fischer style nominal contracts that imply limited persistence of  y ~
t
magnitudes.
                                               
18   As mentioned above, we treat capital as exogenously determined.12
The foregoing is intended to give the reader a broad overview of the M-N
model; for a full description the reader may consult McCallum and Nelson (1998).
19
Here the objective is to combine that structure with a policy rule formulation that
permits a moderately straightforward “measure” of the effect of systematic policy
activism.  We begin with the following rule:
(9) Rt = (1-m3)[Et-1Dpt+1 + m0 + m1(Et-1 Dpt -p
*) + m2Et-1 y ~
t] + m3Rt-1 + et.
In (9), one difference relative to (3) is the inclusion of a lagged Rt term, to reflect a
form of interest-rate smoothing that seems to characterize the behavior of actual central
banks.  In light of estimates and previous experience, our basic experiments will assign
a value of 0.8 for m3.  A second difference is the appearance of m2Et-1 y ~
t, as in the
Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993a), but initially we shall set m2 = 0.  Then with m2 = 0 and m3 =
0.8, the extent to which activist but systematic policy actions are taken is directly
related to the magnitude of m1.  In that regard, a third difference relative to (3) is that
feedback is taken from Et-1Dpt, rather than Et-1Dpt+1.  The reason is that the former is
more effective in this model, as will be seen below.  Since the implicit primary
objective of rule (9) is to keep inflation Dpt close to the target value p
*, one measure of
the effect of policy is the reduction (if any) in the root-mean-square-error (RMSE)
value of Dpt -p
*.  In the simulations reported in this section, all constant terms are set to
zero—a standard practice in stochastic simulation work of this type
20—so the standard
deviation of Dpt can be interpreted as the RMSE value of Dpt - p
*.  Somewhat less
                                               
19   The model is calibrated by reference to relationships estimated in various studies with quarterly data.
A value of 0.8 for h was estimated by Fuhrer (1998).
20   I am not entirely happy with this practice, which implicitly attributes knowledge to policymakers that
they could not actually possess.13
tenuously, the standard deviation of  y ~
t can be interpreted as the RMSE value of yt -
y t.  In all cases, the reported magnitudes are mean values averaged over 100
replications, with each simulation pertaining to a sample period of 200 quarters (after
53 start-up periods are discarded).  Calculation of the rational expectation solutions is
effected by means of Klein’s (1997) algorithm.
The most basic results are given in Table 1.  In the first row of the first panel
we see how the RMSE value of Dp -p
* decreases as additional policy response to
expected target errors is applied.  With m1 = 0.1, there is almost no response to such
errors; with m1 = 0 there would merely be a gradual adjustment of Rt – Et-1 Dpt+1 toward
its long-run average value.  As m1 is increased, with policy-response strength increased,
the standard deviation of Dpt falls distinctly.
In the second panel, feedback response is taken from Et-1Dpt+1 -p
*.  Clearly, the
variability of Dpt is much greater than when Et-1Dpt is the target variable, especially for
large values of m1.  In the model at hand, then, the stabilizing effect of monetary policy
on the inflation rate is greater when Et-1Dpt, rather than Et-1Dpt+1, is the variable
responded to.  That property does not obtain for all model specifications, of course.
In both of the first two panels, we see that application of stronger feedback to
inflation rate discrepancies has the effect of increasing the variability of  y ~
t, the output
gap.  In the third panel we consider policy responses to the output gap, as well as to
inflation.  In particular, we assume that the interest rate instrument is adjusted upward
when Et-1 y ~
t is positive, i.e., when output is expected to exceed its natural-rate value.
As m2 is increased—i.e., moving to the right in the table—we see that the variability of14
Table 1
Simulation Results for Variants of Policy rule (9)
Basic Model; m m3 = 0.8
Case std. dev. of m m1 = 0.1 0.5 1.0 5.0 50.0
Et-1Dpt as target        Dp 10.54 7.37 5.48 1.91 0.24
m2 = 0       y ~   1.45 1.83 2.12 2.71 3.08
       R   2.17 2.55 2.86 3.77 4.50
Et-1Dpt+1 as target        Dp 11.21 9.76 8.57 4.51   * *
m2 = 0                    y ~   1.35 1.52 1.65 2.29   * *
       R   2.06 2.14 2.29 3.25   * *
m m2 = 0.1 0.5 1.0 5.0 50.0
m1 = .5 on Dpt        Dp   7.45 8.29 9.10   13.37   18.77
m2 on Et-1 y ~
t        y ~     1.79 1.70 1.59 0.97     0.17
       R   2.54 2.96 3.32 4.97     6.98
Note: The m2 values actually used are ¼ of the values listed; the latter correspond to
units of measurement in annualized percentage points, as are typically reported in the
Taylor-rule literature.  That statement applies to all results in this paper.15
 y ~
t falls, as one would expect.  Thus it is the case that systematic monetary policy can
be used to stabilize output (i.e., keep yt close to y t) in this model, despite its highly
classical long-run properties.  When m2 is increased with constant m1 and m3,  the
variability of inflation increases.
Another way to see the effect of the systematic portion of monetary policy is to
compare impulse response functions for different values of policy rule parameters.  Let
us return to the case represented in the first panel of Table 1, i.e., with m2 = 0, m3 = 0.8,
and m1 varied over a wide range.  In this context, the impulse response function for the
policy shock itself is not as interesting as for some of the other shocks.  Let us consider
first a shock to the expectational IS function, i.e., a shock to preferences that increases
the demand for current consumption in relation to future consumption.  Impulse
response functions for the variables yt, pt, Dpt, qt, st, and Rt are shown in Figure 1A (for
a unit shock) when m1 = 0.1, i.e., when policy response is very weak.  By comparison,
the same responses are shown in Figure 1B for a very strong policy response, with m1 =
5.   We see that the response of output to the shock is slightly greater in the second
case, but that the responses of inflation and the price level (Dpt and pt) are much
smaller; please note the vertical axis scalings.  Furthermore, the response profiles for qt
and st, the real and nominal exchange rates, are not even of the same shape in the two
panels.
21   Clearly, the systematic component of monetary policy has major effects on
the way in which the economy responds to demand shocks (IS shocks) in this model.
                                               
21   The asymptotic effect on qt is nevertheless the same—zero—in the two cases.16
Also of interest is the difference of the response patterns to a shock to the UIP
relation, i.e., a foreign-exchange risk-premium shock.  Figure 2 includes panels for  the
same two policy rules as reflected in Figure 1.  Thus the top panel, Figure 2A, obtains
when policy responds very weakly to inflation target misses while the bottom panel,
Figure 2B, is for very strong responses.  Again, the responses of Dpt and  pt are
distinctly muted by stronger policy behavior (larger m1 values).  By the “overshooting”
mechanism, consequently, the nominal and real exchange rate responses are larger
when m1 is large.
Finally, let us consider a technology shock, one that increases the value of  y t.
22
Output and real exchange rate responses are not dissimilar with m1 = 0.1 and m1 = 5.0,
but the response of nominal variables is drastically different with the different m1
values—see Figures 3A and 3B.  With m1 = 0.1, inflation falls and then very slowly
returns to zero, whereas with m1 = 5.0 inflation briefly rises.  As a result, the time
profiles for the price level and the nominal exchange rate are extremely different.  All
in all, the differences depicted in Figures 1-3 reflect the effects of the systematic
component of monetary policy behavior in response to shocks of the type that are
crucial in the implementation of monetary policy.
4. Model Specification
The previous section has suggested some procedures for characterizing the
effects of the systematic component of monetary policy for a given structural model.
But of course different models generate very different effects, so it is essential to have17
a strategy for developing a good structural model.  Most researchers would agree that it
is desirable for a model to be consistent with both economic theory and empirical
evidence, but that dual requirement is only a starting point for consideration of
numerous issues.
Like many economists, I have been persuaded that it is a desirable practice to
begin with the construction of a general equilibrium model in which individual agents
are depicted as solving dynamic optimization problems.  As mentioned above, such a
step is neither necessary nor sufficient for obtaining a good model, but is useful in
tending to reduce inconsistencies and forcing the modeller to think about the economy
in a disciplined way.  But adherence to dynamic optimizing general equilibrium
analysis still leaves room for enormous differences among models—even ones that are
of the same scale and include the same variables.  In this section I will attempt to
discuss a few of the crucial specificational issues, illustrating their importance by
various comparisons with the model introduced in the previous section.
One non-standard feature of that model is the presence of  “habit formation” in
consumption behavior.  Much more common is a specification with a time-separable
intertemporal utility function, as utilized for example by Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997), Kerr and King (1996), or McCallum and Nelson (1997).  This more standard
specification can be obtained as a special case of the model of Section 3 simply by
setting the parameter h at the value of zero—see equation (8).  If that is done and
simulations like those of Table 1 are conducted, the results with Et-1Dpt as the target
                                                                                                                                       
22   Although y t depends on raw material inputs, it also has a technology-shock term, as in the real
business cycle literature.  This shock  process is autoregressive of order 1, with parameter 0.95.18
variable are shown in the second panel of Table 2, where the first panel repeats a
comparable reference case from Table 1.  It will be seen that the differences in RMSE
Table 2
Simulation Results for Model Variants
 m m2 = 0.0; m m3 = 0.8
Case std. dev. of m m1 = 0.1  0.5 1.0 5.0 50.0
h = 0.8                    Dp 10.54   7.37 5.48 1.91 0.24
Et-1Dpt as target        y ~   1.45 1.83 2.12 2.71 3.08
       R   2.17 2.55 2.86 3.77 4.50
h = 0.0                        Dp   7.01 6.09 5.33 2.54  0.37
Et-1Dpt as target        y ~   1.38  2.02 2.83 5.47  7.11
m2 = 0        R   3.35       4.02 5.03 8.09  9.88
Closed econ.        Dp 18.33 5.98 2.87 0.59 0.06
Et-1Dpt as target        y ~   1.50 1.42 1.41 1.42 1.44
       R   1.47 1.03 0.99 0.86 0.84
F-M price adj         Dp   3.87 3.48 3.15 2.54 1.87
Et-1Dpt as target               y ~   1.77 2.14 2.45 3.96 8.27
       R   2.84 3.15 3.51 6.87   27.56
F-M price adj        Dp   3.97 3.07 3.36 2.63 2.00
Et-1Dpt+1 as target        y ~     1.81 2.03 2.39 3.54 6.81
       R   2.89    3.02 3.57 5.99   20.4719
values for inflation (for various m1 values) are somewhat smaller than in the reference
case, and that the RMSE differences for y ~
t are substantially larger.  Intuitively, setting
h= 0.0 eliminates a source of consumption persistence that obtains with h = 0.8.  This
change leaves output free to respond more strongly to shocks and simultaneously
makes inflation more controllable by policy actions.
The difference in behavior when h = 0 rather that h = 0.8 shows up even more
dramatically in impulse response functions.  For the purpose of this comparison, we set
m1 at the intermediate value of 1.0 while keeping m2 = 0 and m3 = 0.8.  The responses to
a monetary policy shock are shown in Figures 4A and 4B, where the case with h = 0 is
in part B.  Comparing the upper left panels from the two sets, we see that the response
of yt to a unit Rt shock is almost three times as large when habit formation is absent.
Even more drastically, we see that with h = 0 the response of inflation (and the price
level) is in the opposite direction from that with h = 0.8: an unanticipated increase in Rt
causes Dpt to rise temporarily, rather than fall.  This is the same property that was
observed to obtain in the simple analytical model of Section 2.  Most readers will
probably find it implausible, although it is reminiscent of the “price puzzle” empirical
results that have some tendency to arise in VAR studies with models that include no
commodity-price variable (Sims, 1992).  But the main point to be stressed here is that
behavior is quite different in models with h = 0 and h = 0.8.
23  This difference also
obtains in response to a vt shock, as is illustrated in Figure 5.
                                               
23   This difference has been usefully emphasized by Fuhrer (1996, 1997).  A recent paper by Estrella and
Fuhrer (1998) stresses that “standard models” with h = 0 and a Calvo-Rotemberg price adjustment
specification are seriously inconsistent with the data.  I agree with that judgment but see no reason to
conclude that all optimizing models with rational expectations are unsatisfactory in this regard.20
Next we consider the effect of removing the open-economy features of our
basic model, i.e., converting it to a closed-economy specification.
24    Comparing the
third panel of Table 2 with the first (reference) panel shows that the inflation RMSE
values are much more sensitive to m1 in the closed economy specification—i.e.,
inflation is more readily controllable by monetary policy.  The different m1 settings
have much less effect on  y ~
t variability, however.  One problem with the open-
economy specification of our model is that exports and imports are assumed to respond
promptly—within the period—to changes in their determinants, i.e., the real exchange
rate, foreign income, and domestic income.  It might be more realistic to assume
instead that imports and exports respond in a distributed-lag fashion.
The third specificational change to be considered involves the price adjustment
relation.  With the P-bar specification, our model generates a great deal of persistence
in both yt and y ~
t, but not much for the inflation variable Dpt.  This absence can be seen
in terms of the response of Dpt to a policy shock in the lower-left panel in the top half
of Figure 4; there is some persistence but not much.  The autocorrelation functions for
y ~
t and Dpt, which of course reflect responses to all shocks, are as shown in Table 3.
From the study of Nelson (1998), it is known that as of 1997 most existing
quantitative models designed to incorporate both sticky prices and optimizing behavior
feature little if any inflation persistence.
25  One notable exception is the model of
                                               
24   To close down the basic model, it is necessary not only to eliminate exports and imports, but also to
adjust the variance of the shock term driving y t (because the latter no longer depends on imported raw
materials).  For more explanation, see McCallum and Nelson (1998). 
25  To reflect price level stickiness, some departure from full optimizing behavior is required—e.g., some
additional constraint must be imposed relative to a flexible price general equilibrium system.  There is
considerable scope for dispute concerning the relative “rationality” of different departures.21
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), which was designed so as to provide a good match to the
U.S. autocorrelation functions for y ~
t, Dpt, and Rt.
26  Consequently, it is of interest to
determine how replacement of the P-bar price-adjustment specification with that of
Fuhrer and Moore (F-M) would affect our model.
In fact, we will adopt a slightly modified version of the F-M specification with
two-period contracts, a version that has been used by Fuhrer (1997) and Isard, Laxton,
and Eliasson (1999), among others.  Specifically, we consider the following price
adjustment model:
(10) Dpt = (1-w) EtDpt+1 + wDpt-1 + ay ~
t + ut.
With w = 0.5, this relation is almost identical to the F-M specification, as has been
shown by Walsh (1998, pp. 224-5).
27  Here ut reflects the random, unsystematic
component of pricing behavior; it is assumed to be white noise.  For inclusion in our
simulation analysis, numerical values must be attached to a and su
2 = E(ut
2).  On the





The fourth panel of Table 2 reports RMSE values for simulations with the same
policy rule settings as before.  As can be seen, the extent to which inflation variability
                                               
26   The Fuhrer-Moore (1995) paper does not use optimizing analysis to generate its consumption
behavior, but instead posits a non-expectational IS function. Also it uses detrended yt as its measure of
the output gap.
27   The difference is that (10) includes only  y ~
t in place of 0.5Et(y ~
t + y ~
t+1).
28   To get 0.0032 from the Isard, Laxton, and Eliasson value of 3.2, one divides by 400, because they
express inflation in annualized percentage points, and then divides by 2.5 to reflect the slope of an
Okun’s Law relationship between y ~
t and unemployment.22
depends upon m1 (our measure of policy activism) is much less than with the P-bar
model.  That is because the F-M specification features much more built-in inflation
inertia, and also because of the presence in (10) of the ut component that is not present
in our P-bar cases.  The sensitivity of  y ~
t variability to the policy rule is,
correspondingly, considerably greater than with the P-bar model.  Autocorrelation
coefficients for Dpt and y ~
t are shown in the two rightmost columns of Table 3.  In
keeping with our understanding of the nature of the F-M specification, inflation
persistence is much greater than with the P-bar model, and much closer to that found in
the U.S. data.  The persistence of  y ~
t is about the same as in our basic model, i.e., quite
substantial although less than in the U.S. data. In the fifth panel of Table 2, the policy
feedback rule responds to Et-1Dpt+1 rather than Et-1Dpt, so as to determine whether this
type of “preemptive” response is more effective in the presence of additional inflation
inertia.  As can be seen, however, the results are not greatly affected by this change.
Impulse response functions for the F-M pricing specification are shown in
Figures 6 and 7; the policy rule has m1 = 1.0 and responds to Et-1Dpt+1.  The additional
inflation inertia provided by this model shows up quite clearly in the lower left-hand
panels. It is worth noting that although our P-bar model does not give rise to much
inflation persistence, it does account for a considerable amount of persistence in
output.
29  This finding conflicts with claims made recently by various writers,
including Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1995), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1997), and Andersen (1998).  The reason that such a disagreement is possible is that
                                               




Policy parameters: m m1 = 1.0, m m2 = 0, m m3 = 0.8
  U.S.Data
1 Basic Model       Model with (10) replacing (2)
lag               y ~
t        D Dpt   y ~
t       D Dpt     y ~
t            D Dpt
0 1.000    1.000 1.000    1.000 1.000        1.000
1   .970    .875               .870      .283   .904        .821
2   .910    .827   .758    .051   .814        .666
3   .841     .798   .655   -.013   .726        .531
4   .769    .776   .567   -.017   .637        .415
5   .703    .719   .487   -.019   .549        .315
1  Quarterly, 1955.1 – 1996.4   It should be noted that the the output gap in the first
column is measured as in McCallum and Nelson (1997), not by any detrending
procedure based only on the output series itself.24
 these authors all presume that slow adjustment or staggering of goods prices is
combined with continuous clearing of the labor market.  But what is assumed in the
models given above—as well as in the work of McCallum and Nelson (1997,1998),
Taylor (1979, 1993b), Fuhrer and Moore (1995), and many others—is that firms
produce whatever quantity is demanded at the prevailing price with labor supplying as
much labor as is needed (given capital, technology, and the production function).
Current wages in this arrangement are irrelevant for labor quantity determination,
except via effects on prices, as in the “installment payment” discussion of Hall (1980).
Labor supply conditions are important only in the determination of  y t, not yt - y t.
30
As a consequence, these models do not imply that a contractionary monetary shock
leads to a rise in profits, as suggested by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997).
One important specificational issue that will not be explored quantitatively
concerns the absence of any monetary variables in the basic model of Section 3.  In this
respect that model is consistent with most recent analysis of monetary policymaking, as
represented in the NBER conference volume recently edited by Taylor (1999).  But is it
actually reasonable to conduct monetary policy analysis using an analytical framework
that includes no money demand function and indeed no reference to any monetary
aggregate, either narrow or broad?  At a superficial level, this question is
answered by the well-known point that if a money demand function were appended to
a basic model such as (1)-(3), its only role would be to determine how much money
                                               
 
30   Recall that ‘yt is the natural-rate value of yt that would prevail in the absence of any nominal
frictions.25
would have to be supplied to implement the interest-instrument policy rule; implied
paths of yt, Dpt, and Rt would be entirely unaffected.
At a less superficial level, however, the question becomes one that asks whether
an optimizing specification, with the medium-of-exchange role of money properly
recognized, would yield an expectational IS function that includes no real money
balance terms.  The answer to that question is that such terms are absent only when the
implied “indirect utility function” for the optimizing household is additively separable
in consumption and real money balances.  Thus formulations of the expectational IS
function of the type that are prevalent in the literature—and used above—depend upon
this separability assumption.  To evaluate whether such an assumption is appropriate,
one would have to consider alternative ways of modelling the role of the medium of
exchange—e.g., money in utility function, shopping time, transaction cost, or cash-in-
advance setups—and alternative functional forms (complete with quantitative
properties).  Such a study is far beyond the scope of the present paper, so I will end this
discussion simply by noting that separability is not compatible with the shopping-time
formulation utilized by McCallum and Goodfriend (1987).
5. Model Diagnostics
In the previous section it has been demonstrated that changes in specific details
of a structural model can make major differences in its policy-relevant dynamic
properties.  Consequently, it is important to have a strategy for conducting model
diagnostics, so as to ascertain readily and reliably which models or model variants are
more nearly consistent with actual macroeconomic data.26
In this regard there are clearly many ways to proceed, since there are alternative
ways of presenting the various second moments relevant to a model’s performance.
Again I would like to suggest, however, a procedure that differs from the ones most
common in the VAR-oriented literature.  More specifically, I would suggest that vector
autocorrelation functions of the type utilized by Fuhrer and Moore (1995)—but
augmented by univariate variance statistics—may be a more fruitful source of
information than the impulse response functions that are more frequently emphasized.
The basic point is as follows.  There are reasonably robust procedures,
developed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) and Bernanke and Mihov
(1997), for identifying monetary policy shocks, but these procedures do not identify the
other structural disturbances of a dynamic macroeconomic model.
31  Therefore, these
procedures do not automatically provide data-analysis counterparts to be compared
with impulse response functions for the candidate model’s structural shocks other than
the policy-instrument shock.
32  By contrast, vector autocorrelation functions for actual
data constitute  pure descriptive statistics that can be readily compared with analogous
statistics implied by a candidate model.  It is of course true that autocorrelations in two
sets of (actual or hypothetical) data could agree while the autocovariances nevertheless
differed in magnitude.  Accordingly, one needs to modify the Fuhrer-Moore statistics
to reflect autocovariances rather than autocorrelations.  Or, equivalently, one could
augment the autocorrelations with magnitudes of the variances of each variable in the
(actual or hypothetical) data set.  To me the latter possibility seems somewhat more
                                               
31  There exists some controversy even over the robustness of these procedures.  For recent contributions
on this topic, see Faust (1998) and Uhlig (1999).27
attractive, since it divides the comparison into two parts. The univariate variances
indicate whether the variability of the model’s variables matches that in the data, while
the autocorrelation magnitudes and patterns reflect the nature of the dynamic
interrelationships. Any major discrepancy on any of these dimensions—any
discrepancy between a model’s properties and actual data—reflects a weakness in the
model’s specification. This argument presumes, clearly, that the policy rule in the
model simulations and the various shock variances are realistically matched to the ones
that prevailed over the sample period during which the data was generated.
The foregoing objection to impulse response methods does not pertain, of
course, to VAR systems in which all shocks, not just the one associated with monetary
policy actions, are identified. Examples are provided by Sims (1998), Blanchard and
Watson (1986), and many others. But the identifying restrictions in these systems are
much more demanding and less credible than in the semi-structural systems promoted
by Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998), and others
who seek robustness. But whether this point of view is persuasive or not, the vector
autocorrelation strategy seems at least somewhat attractive because of its purely
descriptive nature (as mentioned by Fuhrer and Moore (1995)).  Accordingly, an
illustrative application will be presented as the remainder of this section.
For the following experiments, we use policy rule (9) with parameter values m1
= 0.5, m2 = 0.4, and m3 = 0.8.  These are chosen to be representative of actual policy
behavior, as estimated by McCallum and Nelson (1998) following Claridi, Gali, and
                                                                                                                                       
32 It would be possible to judge a model’s fit entirely on the basis of the impulse response functions for
the policy shock, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), but this seems undesirable given the small
contribution to overall variability coming from this source.28
Table 4
Model and Data Variability
 Dp        y ~         R
A. U.S. data, variance
a  0.36 4.97 0.49
     1955.1-1996.4 std.dev.
b           2.41 2.23 2.80
B.  Basic Model variance 4.11 3.10 0.53
      m = (0.5, 0.4, 0.8) st. dev. 8.11 1.76 2.92
C.  Basic Model variance 2.56 3.13 1.00
      But with h = 0 std. dev. 6.40 1.77 4.00
D.  Model with variance 0.87 3.52 0.65
      Equation (10) std. dev. 3.74 1.88 3.21
E.  Model with variance 1.04 2.56 0.94
     Eq. (10) and h = 0 std. dev. 4.07 1.60 3.89
a Variance statistics are quarterly fractional units multiplied by 10
4 in all panels.
b Standard deviations are in percentages, annualized for Dp and R, in all panels.29
Gertler (1998).  We begin by combining this rule with our basic model and comparing
its autocorrelation properties (plus variances) with those of actual data.  For the latter, I
use seasonally adjusted observations over 1955.1-1996.4 on Dpt, y ~
t, and Rt as
described in McCallum and Nelson (1998).  The three variances—alternatively
reported as annualized percentage standard deviations—are shown in panel A of Table
4, with autocorrelations presented in Figure 8.
A comparison of panels A and B of Table 4 indicates that the basic model
implies variances of a realistic magnitude for y ~  and  R, but much too large for Dp. In
addition, the autocorrelations depicted in Figure 9 fail badly to match those of Figure 8
in all panels except those for the own autocorrelations of  y ~ and R.  Two of the three
contemporaneous correlation coefficients are of the same sign in the model and in the
data, but only one (for Dp and R) represents a reasonably close quantitative match.
The third panel in Table 4 and Figure 10 pertain to the same model except with
h = 0, i.e., with habit formation eliminated from the households’ saving decision.
Surprisingly, this elimination slightly increases the persistence of inflation.  But it does
not overcome the other major problems with the basic model.
Next we turn to the model in which the price adjustment equation (10) replaces
the P-bar specification.  Now the variance magnitudes, reported in panel D of Table 4,
are closer to those in the data.  And the own autocorrelation functions shown in Figure
11 are distinctly more similar to those of Figure 8.  Indeed, they provide a match that
might be judged as semi-respectable.  But the cross autocorrelations match quite
poorly, especially those involving  y ~ .  Thus this paper’s findings are basically30
consistent with those reported by Fuhrer (1997, 1998).
33  Setting h = 0, in Figure 12
and panel E of Table 4, worsens the match between model and data, especially in terms
of the variance magnitudes.
What can be concluded from these exercises concerning the usefulness of the
variance plus vector-autocorrelation approach to model diagnostics?  The basic
similarity across Figures 9-12 of several of the panels suggests that the autocorrelation
properties are not as sensitive to a model’s specification as are the impulse-response
properties.  This is admittedly a mark against the former approach, but arguably one
that is not as serious as those against the impulse-response approach that are mentioned
in the third paragraph of the present section.  The crucial fact, I would suggest, is that
the variances and autocorrelations together are able to indicate (i) clear discrepancies
relative to the actual data and (ii) clear differences among model variants—both
without requiring any (inherently dubious) identification assumptions other than those
used in developing the model.
6.  Other Approaches
Considerable attention has been devoted, during recent years, to the “narrative
approach” to measuring the effects of monetary policy that was pioneered by Romer
and Romer (1989).  As is well known, the R & R study generated a number of dates at
which the Fed is judged to have “exogenously” adopted a more stringent policy stance
in order to reduce inflationary pressures.  Shapiro (1994), Leeper (1997), and others
have noted, however, that responses to inflation pressures are clearly not exogenous in
                                               
33 They are also somewhat in the spirit of Estrella and Fuhrer (1998), but do not involve the Calvo-31
the sense relevant to the systematic vs. shock decomposition.  Shapiro’s study
represents an improvement in that regard, but would still seem open to the criticism
that it builds upon a measure of policy actions that differs from the usual ones in the
following three respects. (i) Traditional measures use variables that can range over a
near-continuum of values, rather than only two, so can distinguish between major and
minor actions.  (ii) The R & R dummy-variable measure recognizes as non-zero actions
only those in a contractionary direction, leaving decisions to be unusually expansionary
to be included together with normal behavior.  (iii) Values of the R & R dummy are
based on what it is that the Federal Open Market Committee’s records say, not on what
the Open-Market Desk actually does.  All in all, then, it is difficult to understand the
enthusiastic reception that this approach has received.  In any event, the present paper
is concerned more with the systematic portion of policy rather than the portion toward
which the R & R approach is ostensibly directed.
Very recently, a striking and unusual analysis was put forth by Sims (1998).  In
this paper, Sims utilizes VAR procedures but in a different and bolder fashion than
that—typified by Bernanke and Mihov (1998) or Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1998)—mentioned above in Section 2.  In particular, Sims (1998) estimates an
identified VAR system for U.S. monthly data from the interwar period 1919.08-
1939.12 and then conducts counterfactual historical-simulation policy analysis by
replacing the estimated monetary policy rule—represented by the VAR equation
explaining movements in the Federal Reserve discount rate—with one estimated on
postwar data 1948:08-1997:10.   The striking finding emphasized by Sims is that this
replacement has very little effect on the estimated time path of real output that would
                                                                                                                                       
Rotemberg pricing equation that was a component of the MN model criticised by Estrella and Fuhrer.32
have obtained over 1919-1939, given the estimated shocks of that era.  In other words,
monetary policy as practiced during postwar years would not have prevented the Great
Depression.  This dramatic conclusion is reinforced by Christiano’s (1998) finding that
Sims’s conclusion is not overturned by replacement of his discount rate rule with one
that generates a much more expansionary time path for the M1 money stock.
Both of these studies are, clearly, open to Lucas-critique objections.  Both
authors recognize that problem, Sims contending that the usual objection is
philosophically flawed (1998, pp. 17-19) and Christiano leaving it for consideration by
his readers (1998, p. 4).  My own belief is that the relationship between
macroeconomic variables—nominal income or prices and output—and monetary
policy variables during the interwar years cannot be satisfactorily represented by a
model that does not include some variable representing the effects of financial crises.
In my (1990) study, for example, I found that the relationship between M1 growth and
growth in the monetary base was strongly influenced by a measure of  current bank
failures (prior to the creation of the FDIC).
34
Another VAR-oriented approach to the study of systematic monetary policy
responses was developed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997), who concluded
that a large fraction of the U.S. economy’s real effects from oil price shocks since 1970
has resulted from the monetary policy response to these shocks, rather than from the
shocks themselves.  The study is concerned with attributing historical fluctuations to
various sources, rather than with the type of characterization attempted in the present
                                               
34 My study found that a policy rule that adjusts the monetary base so as to attempt to keep nominal
income on a steady growth path would have made the 1930’s fall in nominal income much less severe
than actually occurred.  This activist feedback rule would have resulted in a much greater expansion of33
paper.  Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997, p. 93) state that their method “certainly is
not invulnerable to the Lucas critique.”
Closer in spirit and approach to the present paper is a very recent study by
Dotsey (1999).  It, too, utilizes simulations with a setup that features maximizing
behavior and aspires to the development of a policy-invariant, structural model, and it
reaches similar conclusions.  One major difference relative to the present paper is that
Dotsey’s comparisons are made across entirely different policy-rule specifications,
rather than across different parameter settings for variants of a single rule, as is
typically the case in Sections 3-5 above.
7. Conclusions
Let us conclude with a very brief summary.  The paper has argued that, in studying the
monetary policy transmission process, more emphasis should be given to the
systematic portion of policy behavior and correspondingly less to random shocks—
basically because shocks account for a very small fraction of policy-instrument
variability.  Analysis of the effects of the systematic part of policy requires structural
modelling, rather than VAR procedures, because the latter do not give rise to
behavioral relationships that can plausibly be regarded as policy-invariant.  By use of
an illustrative structural specification with variants, the paper characterizes the effects
of policy parameter settings by means of impulse response functions and root-mean-
square statistics for target errors.  Different models give different answers to questions
about the effects of systematic policy, so procedures for scrutinizing model
                                                                                                                                       
M1 than in Christiano’s  counterfactual simulation (which was in turn more expansionary than Sims’s).
What this monetary stimulus would have done for real output depends, of course, on the model utilized.34
specification are essential. In this regard, it is argued that vector autocorrelation
functions, augmented by variance statistics for each of a model’s variables, seem more
promising than impulse response functions because the latter require shock
identification, which is inherently a difficult process.35
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Fig. 1B: Responses to Unit Shock to IS; mu1 = 5.040










































































Fig.2B: Response to Unit Shock to UIP; mu1 = 5.041










































































Fig. 3B: Responses to Unit Shock to Ybar; mu1 = 5.042







































































4B: Responses to Unit Shock to Policy Rule, with h = 0.043










































































5B: Responses to Unit Shock to IS; h = 0.044








































































6B: Responses to Unit Shock to IS45












































































































































































































































































Autocorrelation functions for dp, ytilde, R in model with (10) and h = 0.0